Sophisticated fraud operations rely on a vast network of companies and services to execute their schemes, from luring victims to pocketing their money.
At the heart of these operations lie call centers. Staffed by persuasive agents, these centers pressure individuals worldwide into fake investment deals. But the fraudsters do not work alone. They depend on a complex web of third-party providers—marketers, tech platforms, payment firms, and shell companies—each taking a cut.
Investigators have uncovered two major fraud rings, one based in Israel and Europe, and another in Georgia, and the numerous businesses that enabled them. This infrastructure is broken into three key phases: snaring the victim, building false trust, and collecting the cash.
Phase 1: Luring the Target
The first step involves capturing potential victims through aggressive online advertising. External marketers post ads promoting lucrative returns, often featuring fake celebrity endorsements. When people click, they land on pages that request contact details.
These marketers are compensated for every person who later deposits funds. Many operate covertly, using anonymous shell companies, encrypted chats, and cryptocurrency.
One firm called MGA Team, claiming a Moscow headquarters, earned over half a million dollars in 2024 from a single scam ring. Another, known as CRYP, received almost $850,000 in nine months. Bulgaria-registered Sierra Media pushed a fraudulent trading platform even after global regulators flagged it. U.S.-based Oray Ads was paid over $146,000 for leads.
Social media giants also play a role. Despite policies banning scam content, ads proliferate. Meta, which owns Facebook and Instagram, has been criticized for failing to screen such material. One analysis showed 58% of crypto ads on Facebook were scams. Google similarly admitted scammers have grown more sophisticated, though it claimed to have removed billions of ads.
Another platform, Taboola, was frequently cited as an ad source for the fraud network.
Phase 2: Winning Trust and Managing Deception
Once victims provide their information, call center agents contact them almost immediately. This rapid response is enabled by software that feeds leads directly into the scammers’ databases.
Customer relationship management (CRM) software is central. One firm, Getlinked.io, provided tools to manage affiliates. Another, called PumaTS, was used by the Georgia operation. Evidence showed agents could manipulate fake deposits and alter trade outcomes.
Remote access software like AnyDesk allowed fraudsters to monitor victims’ screens and steal personal data. The company said it works with law enforcement but acknowledged scammers often coach victims past security warnings.
Voice-over-IP (VoIP) services enable massive international calling. Israeli firm Coperato received over $1 million for services, while Squaretalk was paid at least $150,000. Even after exposure, agents still used Squaretalk lines, though the company claimed cooperation with investigators.
Phase 3: Moving and Hiding the Money
Getting the cash requires careful planning to avoid detection. The fraudsters often guided victims on how to answer bank questions and pushed them toward specific institutions.
Revolut was the most common bank for English-speaking victims of the Georgia ring, handling nearly 600 transactions out of 5,000. Chase UK was also recommended by scammers. Wise and Wirex were other frequently used platforms.
Spanish banks Santander and BBVA held accounts linked to a scheme that moved over 5 million euros from 600 people in under two years. Both banks said they have robust compliance measures.
To obscure the money trail, fraudsters used underground payment facilitators like Bankio and Anywires. These providers supplied shell company accounts and fake invoices, charging fees of 10% to 17%. Another service, known as “Britain Local,” provided U.K. bank accounts for a 13% commission.
Shell companies were crucial. Spain-registered Selterico SL passed hundreds of thousands of euros through its accounts. U.K.-registered Greencode Connection received over 400,000 euros before a court ordered it to pay millions in compensation to a victim. Others like Purplesun Limited and Intek Systems Limited served similar purposes.
These entities exist on paper but are often owned by individuals with no other business interests, making them difficult to trace. The entire system reveals a shadowy ecosystem that enables fraud on a massive scale, with many participants knowingly or unknowingly profiting from the misery of others.