Western Components Found in Majority of Russian Weapons Used Against Ukraine

by Sarah Steffens

Despite three years of international sanctions aimed at crippling Russia’s military capabilities, an investigation has revealed that Western-made microchips and other restricted components continue to power the majority of Moscow’s high-precision missiles and drones used in attacks on Ukraine. At least 722 Ukrainian civilians have been killed by such weapons, a figure experts say likely underrepresents the true toll.

The sanctions, designed to deprive Russia of advanced technology necessary for its precision-guided munitions, have largely failed. An analysis of Ukrainian intelligence data found that foreign parts—including microprocessors from Texas Instruments, Analog Devices, and Maxim Integrated Products—are present in 95 percent of Russian missiles and drones, with 72 percent of these components originating from American manufacturers.

The flow of restricted microelectronics into Russia has been sustained by a vast network of intermediaries registered primarily in China, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Hong Kong. In many cases, Russian nationals have established companies in these jurisdictions specifically to circumvent Western restrictions. From 2022 through January 2024, customs data shows more than 200,000 shipments of prohibited microelectronics entered Russia.

A particularly stark example occurred on July 8, 2024, when a Kh-101 cruise missile struck Kyiv’s Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital, killing and wounding civilians, including cancer patients. According to reports, that missile contained at least 16 components originating from the United States and Switzerland.

While American companies like Analog Devices, Texas Instruments, and Intel have publicly opposed the military use of their products, they have struggled to oversee their complex supply chains. In September 2024, executives from these firms testified before the U.S. Senate, acknowledging gaps in compliance. A subsequent Senate report criticized the companies for responding too slowly and taking insufficient action to prevent Russian military access.

Western sanctions have targeted some key Russian and foreign suppliers, but widespread loopholes persist. Over half of the 100 largest Russian importers of restricted microelectronics have avoided sanctions entirely. Even among those blacklisted, many continued importing through shell companies and new intermediaries.

Investigators also uncovered direct links between Russian electronics importers and the country’s military-industrial complex. For instance, SPS-Group LLC, which purchased Texas Instruments microprocessors, openly serves defense manufacturers producing missile guidance systems. Similarly, Onelek LLC and Ural Radio Stations advertise their work fulfilling Russian state defense contracts.

Even in countries bound by Western sanctions, some firms quietly supplied restricted goods. Aerospace Components, a Hungarian company, shipped microelectronics to Russia. Its founders are Russian businessmen with documented ties to state-owned arms manufacturers.

Researchers at the Kyiv School of Economics warn that without stricter enforcement, real-time customs data sharing, and more aggressive secondary sanctions targeting intermediaries, the Russian military will continue to access the components it needs. As diplomatic shifts reshape U.S. policy under the current administration—which has taken a notably passive stance toward Moscow—experts fear that the failure to close these loopholes leaves Ukraine’s civilian population exposed to continued deadly strikes using Western-built technology.